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Article 4

ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS
LAWRENCE

C.

GEORGE*

Professor George analyzes what he sees as ProfessorBrilmayer's
major thesis: that neither modern choice of law nor equal protection principles provide a sound basis for jurisdictional doctrine. Concluding that she has failed to consider a possible Critical Legal Studies approach to the problems she poses, he
suggests one.

P

ROFESSOR Brilmayer asks a tough question when she poses
the problem of how "we" should treat "them," when our legal
regime divides "us" from "them" with a term like citizenship, or
even residency. She follows the implications of her legal query to
the heart of liberal (or as she would have it, "democratic") political
theory. According to Professor Brilmayer, in the law of jurisdiction, that theory has taken two operational forms, both of them
flawed by extremism. One form, less familiar to general legal scholarship and political theory, justifies too much state-selfishness; the
other form, emphasizing the rights of isolated individuals, justifies
too much interference with benign localism. Success in finding the
middle ground will depend upon our ability to accept a divorce
between political theories of participation in value choice (shaping)
and theories of legal obligation (sharing). Dissociation of the two
ideas of shaping and sharing is necessary in order to allow for a
more principled and persuasive defense of unwanted "sharing" of
legal disadvantages by nonshapers.'
In the following reflections, my intention is to respectfully challenge Professor Brilmayer's fundamental point, because it seems to
me she misconceives the nature of the respective appeals of states
and of "outside" individuals, through a common rhetoric of
* B.S., 1956, University of Chicago; LL.B., 1959, Yale University. The usual ascriptions
of blame and responsibility belong with the author, who plies his trade at the Florida State
University. The author wishes to thank Professor Brilmayer for giving the Ladd Lecture
which provoked these reflections, and to acknowledge encouragement and help from
Michael Ansaldi, Steven Gey and H.C. Macgill. The incentives and disincentives shaping
the pursuit of scholarship in his college have compelled the author to abandon his wish to
remain pseudonymous, and to withdraw a prior version of this footnote at the request of the
editors. A copy of the withdrawn note remains on file with the Florida State University
Law Review. One further disclaimer: The present remarks are not intended, in any sense, to
constitute a book review.
1. See Brilmayer, Shaping And Sharing In Democratic Theory: Towards a Political
Philosophy of Interstate Equality, 15 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 389 (1987).
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"rights," to politically rooted conceptions of legal inequality. I find
it implausible to suppose our difficulties come from a philosophical
error expressed in the idea that both Carolene Products2 and
choice of law ideology in the era of the Second Restatement of
Conflicts share a common fallacy of political theory. Nevertheless,
I must agree that there is some kind of mistake or aberration that
forces legal discourse to confront a false dilemma, characterized in
the "interstate discrimination" cases by vacillations between excessively radical individualism and unprincipled statism.
I.

PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS

While she makes cogent and telling points against some reductionist understandings of the logic of "interest analysis" which I
fully accept, it seems to me that Professor Brilmayer herself misunderstands, in a significant and provocative way, the political antinomies that fuel the ongoing legal debate over long-arming and
forum-preferring. The conclusion, dictated by her rejection of what
she characterizes as a false dilemma between alternative "all-ornone" rules to govern challenges of forum favoring laws or applications of law, itself appears to me to be ironically "all-or-none."
Before I turn to my reservations about an imaginative and widesweeping argument, I feel obliged to note that challengers of any
interstate discrimination on the basis of being "insiders" or "outsiders" are (necessarily) litigious contemporaries. They are people
who feel correctly or incorrectly victimized across some moral and
geographical boundary by selfish but politically powerful "others."
The arguments of Professor Brilmayer are all premised upon the
objectors' legal obligation to submit to others' laws, and upon arguments for the legitimacy of rights ascribed to bodies politic.
The limitations imposed by her concern for the merits of specific
legal disputations make themselves felt when Professor Brilmayer
imports only a portion of relevant political theory in her discussion
of states' rights against "foreign" individuals. Her arguments on
both legal and political subjects are synchronous, not diachronous.
They do not seek a philosophical understanding of historical
changes in thought about legitimacy and fairness, nor do they consider the equities of interstate discriminations that may prejudice
the unborn. Professor Brilmayer looks to political theory as a
source of answers to jurisdictional questions. The half-light shed
2.

United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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by political theory upon the jurisprudence of judicial and legislative jurisdiction is fascinating; but the view it gives us is incomplete, oblique, and therefore distorted. For Professor Brilmayer,
the sovereign's right derives from the will of its democratic constituency. It is therefore entitled to at least equal, and probably
greater, respect than the "rights" of individuals to be left alone
within their properly defined spheres of autonomy. The primacy of
the state's right to pursue its chosen ends without (much) regard
for nondomestic consequences is an essential element in a structure of justification that is intended to cut objecting individuals
down to size.
I question the form of Professor Brilmayer's argument as well.
Her approach may be characterized as a "top-down" view of a sovereign's "democratically" justifiable powers. Such a view gives the
reader a foreshortened perspective on persons who are not constituents of the lawmaking (or law-applying) power. In Professor
Brilmayer's regime, objectors who must suffer disadvantageous legal treatment because of their "outside" status are to be thought of
primarily as tourists, or if not tourists, at least as the holders of an
implicit and revocable visa. This idea derives from a theme of
democratic political theory that does not receive extensive discussion in Professor Brilmayer's article: the theory, or metaphor, of
the social contract. In the law of interstate relations, the contract
is spoken of in terms such as "taking the burdens along with the
benefits," or "purposeful availment" of the forum's laws, institutions, and amenities. As with all political theories organized around
this metaphor of existential consent, the "acceptance" of the contract is imputed' on the basis of circumstances often reflecting no
choice." In the law of interstate jurisdiction, which inspires much
of Professor Brilmayer's political theorizing, the fictional character
of the social compact has long been recognized, but an ideology of
consent strongly affects the more "realistic" talk about long-arming that replaced it.
What makes one an "outsider" for Professor Brilmayer is one's
legitimate exclusion from the political processes that dictated a
challenged law or law application (shaping). This mode of defini3. For an example of this fiction in jurisdictonal law, see Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13
(1928).
4. See HUME, A TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE, Book lII, Part II, § 8 ("On The Sources of
Allegiance"); J. AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE, Lecture VI. Compare L. DEKOSTER,
LOCKE'S SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL,

EXTENT,

AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

A

CONTEMPORARY SELECTION §

119ff (1978).
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tion results in a very heterogeneous class of legal persons and interests, who share only the accident of being nonshapers of laws
they challenge. Their exclusion generally reflects the mere happenstance of nonmembership in an organic and valuable cultural community, characterized by consensus. "Otherness" is an accident of
birth or nomadism. The status of being outside the (politically organized and autonomous) community puts a challenger of its law
in a category that has no intrinsic claim to constitutional significance for Professor Brilmayer: tourists are indistinguishable from
wetbacks; or if distinguished at all, it is by other considerations
subsumed under the term sharing.
Once exclusion from law-shaping has been denied any equitable
weight in the analysis of boundary-crossing "discriminations," Professor Brilmayer turns her incisive logic upon the political theory,
and the actual legal practice, of sharing. While struggling to follow
the Brilmayer thesis, I could not overcome my difficulties with her
treatment of the related, but usefully distinguishable ideas of
equal protection of the law (regarded as a constant, or global,
norm) and equal protection by some coherent body of law against
what nineteenth century jurists unhesitatingly branded as "usurpation." 5 Having moved since Pennoyer6 from the normification of
geography to a more functional analysis of state and interstate
power, legal doctrine is forced by Professor Brilmayer's discussion
to contemplate the certainties it left behind. There is an undercurrent of nostalgia beneath the surface of Brilmayer's text for the
certainties of Pennoyer or pre-Pennoyer discourse. Professor
Brilmayer proposes to resolve the mysteries she has unfolded by
assigning every legal person to the subjection of various or competing Dantean sovereignties-limiting the circles, however, to three:
1. Members of the forum state (voters, shapers of its law).
2. Children, visitors, denizens, all others who fall within the
state's jurisdiction conceived as passive beneficiaries of territorial
power.7
3. Strangers, "outside the jurisdiction."
The first circle is merely contextual; no relevant claim of interstate discrimination can be made against their own forum or legislature by its occupants. Occupants of the second circle are entitled
5.
6.
7.

See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
Id.
See Brilmayer, supra note 1, at 413-14.
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to the civil right of equal protection, but in an attenuated sense.'
The third circle is the arena of a war of each against all, mediated
within our national boundaries by unexercised ultimate federal
power under the commerce (and perhaps other) constitutional
clauses. Problems of fairness arise within each circle, but the most
serious problems arise when we seek criteria for assigning persons
to their proper circles in the first place.
For Professor Brilmayer, the fundamental right of migration or
exit is a great justification of invidious discrepancies in the treatment accorded occupants of the second circle. Visitors are not entitled to tuition equality with resident students, for example.' If
they don't like it, they can go home. This doctrine of Hobbesian
hospitality is probably more deeply embedded in some legal cultures, including our own, than in others. Visiting students in the
United Kingdom, for example, are accorded public health benefits
along with nationals; and perhaps for practical reasons, the cost of
a postage stamp is the same for everyone within every jurisdiction
known to this writer. It is also worth noting that an out-of-state
student having paid tuition, albeit a higher amount, has purchased
some degree of "insider" status, at least to the extent that they are
no longer occupants of the outer Dantean circle.
A fundamental axiom for Professor Brilmayer is that visitors to
Rome must do as the Romans do, even if their subjection to others'
law has more of a flavor of comity to it, or mere prudence, than of
political allegiance. The nature of felt political obligation (where
such obligation is felt at all) to obey the law is "different" in some
respects for aliens, visitors, denizens, green-carders, Indians, minors, felons and all other "nonshapers" or outsiders than it is for
shapers-the innermost insiders. Once the task of shaping the law
has reached completion, the sharing of its burdens, even when
those burdens are imposed across some kind of political boundary
(and presumably across temporal boundaries, too) is for Professor
Brilmayer a question of power relationships among sovereigns
much more than it is a matter of civil or constitutional rights.
There is something paradoxical in Professor Brilmayer's use of the
term sharing to describe a process that results in subjugation to
rules challenged for being invidiously hostile to their disenfranchised challenger.
8. Id. at 414: "[Tjhe responsibilities of the state to protect such persons are also more
limited."
9. Id.
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EQUAL PROTECTION

Using Carolene Products as the epitome of constitutional reasoning that supports a systematic or presumptive doubt of the fairness of classifications based upon "outsideness," Professor
Brilmayer undertakes to show that a model of fairness based upon
process defects harmful to "discrete and insular minorities" has no
relevance to problems of "interstate discrimination." To assume
otherwise is to oversimplify by confusing or conflating the ideas of
participation in lawmaking (shaping,in Professor Brilmayer's terminology) and of generality of already-shaped legal categories
(sharing,in Professor Brilmayer's terminology). Once this fallacy
has been exposed, along with its correlative error, we can find a
middle ground upon which we can build doctrines that avoid the
paranoid suspicion that forum laws favor only living political constituents, or the opposite trap of turning a necessary distinction of
democratic political theory into an invidious legal category.
Challengers of invidious localism can claim that the law or the
forum they object to has less legitimacy on a scale of measurement
that gives shapers the greatest obligation of loyalty to norms of
their own "choosing." 10 Thus the political legitimacy of legal norms
is, after all, determined in Professor Brilmayer's democratic theory
by measurement along the axes of some incremental scale of citizen participation.
Take, for example, the United States citizens who reside in the
District of Columbia. Professor Brilmayer is apparently confident
that they have no just claim to vote in Florida, or Connecticut, or
anywhere but the District of Columbia, although they must obey
the domestic laws of any state with which they have appropriate
connections. The District (perhaps oppressively) is denied by Congress and the Constitution its just measure1" of political voice in
the national legislature, but that is of no consequence if District
residents demand a (national or local) voice elsewhere. It would be
a flagrant offense to Professor Brilmayer's first principles if the political demands of District of Columbia residents were ultimately
resolved by a rule that allowed them randomly or deliberately to
make themselves electors, as a group, in one or another of the
10. Id. at 391. "[Tlhe state's power is at its most legitimate when it is dealing with its
own citizens, acting within its own territory, and affecting only persons and property that
are also local."
11. The principle of "one man, one vote" embodied in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1961), and articulated in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963), is the standard of
justice most useful, because least controversial, for the purposes of this discussion.
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nearly 500 Congressional districts in the United States. Would it
be less offensive if individual District of Columbia residents could
choose a highly theoretical affiliation for voting purposes with
some "foreign" place in the United States? If they were allowed as
a group to join one and only one polity or another at each election,
District residents would have disproportionate political power because they could credibly threaten to make a decisive difference in
a state such as North Carolina, where the emergence of a figure
like Senator Helms can only be explained in terms of a delicate
local balance of forces.
But what is the legal significance of such political franchise arguments? For Professor Brilmayer, the answer is none-in relation
to the problem she calls "interstate discrimination." But the legitimacy of excluding others cannot be deduced from the concept of
the state (or other political unit) quite so simply. The terms by
which exclusive "communities of shapers" are (self) constituted require a more elaborate justification than is provided by traditional
federalistic apologetics for the value of diversity.1" In any case, the
idea that we need political variety in order to make the legal world
more interesting and experimental has usually been associated
with the legal politics of "states' rights," rather than the individual
civil rights exemplified by Carolene Products.
The appeal of "federalist" arguments for localized "control" and
group autonomy, even at the level of political theory, is directed to
the practical or instrumental efficiency of such arrangements in
conducing to some other higher good: a theme that goes back to
the Greek polis and to later Enlightenment elaborations of "democracy" as a pure form of social organization. In modern times,
the thesis has generated utopias of a dangerous kind-either impractical communes and ashrams, answering to the need for clansized "togetherness," or monolithic, homogenized, fascistic states.
Thus the "discrete and insular minorities" of Carolene Products
are best understood and defined as persons wrongfully excluded
from political bodies to which they rightfully belong. To call their
complaint a (mere) "process defect" is to misunderstand the foundations of Carolene Products in political morality. The confusion
may be clarified, perhaps, if we compare the solicitude of the Court
toward "discrete and insular minorities" who seek recognition for
12. Professor Brilmayer provides examples of international and largely cultural diversity
to support her point about the need for political autonomy at the level of some unspecified
ideal group size. Presumably the optimal polis from either a cultural or political viewpoint is
closer in size to ancient Athens than to a modern congressional district.
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their self-chosen "secession" from the norms chosen by the surrounding body politic. In terms of political ideology, we might say
that Wisconsin v. Yoder's shows us the difference between claims
for protection from the state, and (equal) protection of or by the
state.
Meaningful political participation as a shaper of legal norms is a
scarce and limited commodity. Equality before the law is respected
in Professor Brilmayer's political theory, only if the challenger of
"foreign" law is either a chooser (a purposeful availer) of that law's
burdens and benefits, or can be shown to have a similar, if irrelevant, voice in shaping corresponding norms that would apply
through the "fairness" of symmetrical logic, to outsiders forced to
litigate in her own forum.
Surely we may hope that the state's legitimate claims for extraterritorial scope of a domestic law can find a more solid foundation
than a theory of political representation that invites attack on its
own terms, having already so diluted the powers of governed individuals that nearly everyone feels anomic and alienated. 1 4 But the
second half of Professor Brilmayer's critique of the Carolene Products fallacy is equally problematic. She argues that the burden of
the law can generally, indeed, nearly always, be imposed upon
(shared with) others who did not shape it, because the disenfranchised "victim" of forum-favoring rules is the beneficiary of
other advantages accruing from the forum's existence as the organ
of a coherent legal and political authority.
In Brilmayer's theory of the state, persons considered in their
capacities as subjects of a single legitimate sovereign, are Hobbesian or Nozickian political atoms, behaving through their representatives in a parochial or self-favoring manner (such is the nature of
us sinners). Directly and indirectly, we get away with as much as
we can, but we must not think of this aspect of the human condition as intrinsically unjust, selfish, or wasteful. Injustice is a label
reserved for those occasions when the state explicitly favors locals
13. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
14. Perhaps the dilution of "voice" and "control" should be reversed, under the logic of
Professor Brilmayer's thesis, because modern mass democracies have already conceded too
much shaping to too many people for their several or collective good. Butting in where you
have no business is a sin less likely to be committed by a fraudulent tourist than by the
multitudes who fought for a franchise that their successors are too ignorant or indifferent to
exercise responsibly as Burkean "value-choosers." I do not suggest that Professor Brilmayer
subscribes to such elitist politics, but its historical association with the arguments she
adopts as central cannot pass without remark.
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qua locals. 6 This practice violates the caselaw principles of interstate jurisdiction, and Kantian principles of political morality. 6
On the caselaw side, the "right" to impose local law is derived from
the benefits conferred by (presumably other) local law. On the side
of political morality, the enactment of any law transforms its political character from a tool of interested coalitions pursuing their
own advantage into a "value choice" of the entire community of
shapers. Values, as opposed to interests or persons, have no temporal, personal, or geographical constraints; they are limited at most
by principles of accommodation with other values. Hence, Professor Brilmayer can argue that however controversial the scope of a
statute's application may be, it is never permissible to construe it
as confined by its politically instrumental raison d'etre to the purposes of those who secured its enactment (including the outvoted
opposition).
The importance of law-as-value for Professor Brilmayer's arguments is also exemplified in her dismissal of "economic" analysis of
"interstate discrimination." The law and economics dialect of legal
discourse frames questions of boundary-crossing fairness in terms
of "externalities." A particular legal norm is chosen in a legitimate
way, in legal economics, if all costs and all benefits are reckoned
fairly in a computation of its instrumental worth. No fair reckoning can be made or expected if the costs are not billed to the same
account as the benefits. If some flaw in the overall system allows
me to rationally maximize my parochial welfare by sending the
bills to you, I have (perhaps) been wasteful to the extent that your
"cost" may exceed my "benefit." Rules are therefore arguably
needed to keep the ledgers straight.
This familiar line of reasoning is confuted by simply ignoring the
difference between "me" and "you" in the above outline. It may be
true that my gain is at your expense, but if that counted against
my pursuit of my own advantage, then you would "gain" exemption from my costful choice at my "expense" in having an otherwise open option foreclosed. Gains and losses may be generalized
and the accounting metaphor pursued to its bitter end to show
that these double entries axiomatically result in an even balance.
15. Professor Brilmayer has a curiously oblique way of stating this point, which may
have caused this reader to misunderstand her. See Brilmayer, supra note 1, at 409: "But
refusing to share with outsiders the benefits that the insiders played a special role in creating is not an appropriate way to fulfill the legislative mandate to further the interests of the
people ......
16. See Brilmayer, supra note 1, at 411-12.

458

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:449

Thus, the rhetoric of "externalities" is useless in the analysis of
interstate discrimination because it conceals an equivocation that
is ably demonstrated by Professor Brilmayer, only to reappear in a
slightly altered form when she produces her own synthesis of law
and political morality. To refute economic efficiency analysis of
boundary-crossing legal distinctions, Professor Brilmayer reviews
and applies the critical literature on Coase's theorem to demonstrate its neutrality on the issue of interstate discrimination.1"
Since it is lexically arbitrary to say that my aggrandizement
(through legitimately vicarious participation in my sovereign's lawmaking) is your "externality," the "economic" evaluation of the
competing claims for long-arm jurisdiction or forum-favoring
choice of law teaches us that the tough "interstate discrimination"
issues are, by definition, the stakes in a zero-sum game.
I am inclined to accept most of Professor Brilmayer's argument,
up to this point. But the rhetoric of sharing suffers from a similar
logical vulnerability. The difficulty would be more apparent had
Professor Brilmayer digressed for a moment to more fully define
her concept of sharing in terms of her idea of interstate discrimination. The idea of discrimination appears in the Brilmayer argument in two guises: sometimes the challenger is imagined to be
complaining about unfair exclusion from the benefits of forum law,
and sometimes from the unfair exclusion from the benefits of his
or her domestic (or any other-than-forum) law through the application of forum law."8
These ideas are not synonymous. Nor are they particularly "intuitive." What is intuitive is the idea that Professor Brilmayer sets
out to trash-that there is something ethically suspicious in having
the "home court advantage" for the litigation game. "Neutral"
courts have costs of their own in the moral accounting of Professor
Brilmayer's political economy. There is no escaping from choice (of
law or forum or both), and choice is necessarily invidious. The
same point may be raised if we ask whether the unfairness of discrimination is the consequence of the sharing of a "benefit" to
which a claimant is not justly entitled (an "unjust enrichment"
kind of discrimination) or from the sharing of a "burden" imposed
by the chosen law, speaking as it always does in the imperative,
present and universal voice. I shall call this latter form of legal
reification "sand-trap positivism," since it invites an analogy to the
17.
18.

Id. at 403-06.
Id. at 412-13.
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game of golf.'" Individuals go out on the open fairway of life, pursuing their lifeplan until they "hole out" at the end, hoping not to
fall into the legal roughs and bunkers set in their way as obstacles,
justified by the "lay of the land" and minimization of the interference effects of an unstructured liberty.
To pursue this facetious metaphor, the question not clearly resolved by Professor Brilmayer is whether we all play on the same
course, or on contiguous courses. It may be wise to leave the course
design to manageable groups of "regular" players. Shaping is one
thing, as Professor Brilmayer ably argues, but is it true that anyone may be made to share the hazards? Only if there is some sense
in which all the courses are indeed contiguous, can we begin to say
that we know how to map the fairways. May the same hazard serve
two different courses? Certainly; but then there will be arguments
about which course was being played. Perhaps the same lie is
"easy" with reference to the domestic course on which I thought
myself playing, and impossibly difficult if it is considered part of
the opponent's course.
Sand-trap positivism invites sandbox conceptions of fairness:
"[R]efusing to share with outsiders the benefits that the insiders
played a special role in creating is not an appropriate way to...
further the interests of the people .... 2
Professor Brilmayer is very conscious of the fallacy of arguments
that would support interstate discrimination in a sense that triggers equal protection concerns.2" But having rejected "process-oriented" principles of limitation, she is left with the "limitation" of
self-dealing or self-aggrandizement exemplified by an example of
insurance legislation, enacted for politically suspect or parochial
purposes, but thereafter existing as an "equal" hazard for insured
and uninsured players, insiders and outsiders, alike. In other
words, the very generality and universality of the legal norms of
expression gives it some kind of Kantian legitimacy which at the
same time limits instrumental interpretations that would very rationally restrict "benefits" to the group (insurers) the law was intended to benefit. Pursuing this philosophical theme into the actualities of jurisdictional caselaw, Professor Brilmayer finds the law
19. See E.F. BENSON, SECRET LIVES 44 (1985).
20. See Brilmayer, supra note 1, at 409.
21. It is nevertheless curious that the constitutional applicability of equal protection
analysis to "interstate discrimination" receives only the negative notice of Professor
Brilmayer's rejection of Carolene Products reasoning.
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"very clear"" that a quid pro quo is necessary, in the form of
demonstrated "advantages" given by the forum which presently
proposes to exact the price, of submission to a disadvantageous forum or to the application of disadvantageous local law.
If that Shoe 23 fits, we should be happy to wear it; but it does not,
if we look at the history and critique of the "tradeoff" rationale in
courts and commentaries. The problem is that the linkage between
absentees and foreign sovereigns originally proposed by International Shoe, and reiterated in subsequent attempts to specify the
limits of extraterritorial power, is too "theoretical" and therefore
too broad. The Court has found itself driven from political philosophizing about the social compact to a lawyer's demand for the actual writing-from "justice and fair play" to a tangled web of
"contacts," "contracts," and other circumstances comprised in the
idea of specific jurisdiction.2 4 Any attempt to chronicle accurately,
or currently portray the "reach" of a domestic law beyond purely
domestic disputes is beyond the compass of this essay, but we
must at least acknowledge that in its personal jurisdiction decisions, the Court has long been trying without success, and without
deliberate resort either to Carolene Products or to modern interest-analysis choice of law theory, to "balance" the claims of "outsiders" to stay outside the reach of forum law, with countervailing
and legitimately "global" value choices expressed in forum law.
In my estimation, the Court has been far more sensitive than
Professor Brilmayer would approve of, to the fact that local courts
and legislators are primarily or even overwhelmingly responsive to
the "special" interests of powerful but relatively ephemeral local
constituencies. The caselaw through which this sensitivity is manifested does not however appear in any obvious way to be an extended gloss on Carolene Products.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 411.
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
See von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79
HARV. L. REV. 1121 (1966). The authors' analysis has had a powerful influence on jurisdictional thought, along with Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), so that the latest formulation of the constitutional limits of the long-arm, Asahi Metal Ind., Ltd. v. Superior Court,
107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987), establishes "an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward
the forum state" (emphasis in original) as an essential element of personal jurisdiction. The
purposeful availment slogan overlaps the even narrower conception that the subject matter
of the controversy must have specific connections to the forum state, but in the cited case,
and many others, the action is by a locally injured plaintiff against a foreign manufacturer
for injuries caused by defects in goods brought to the plaintiff by the "stream of commerce."
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III. INTEREST ANALYSIS

The logic of her very good argument against not only economic
metaphors, but also all other utilitarian calculations of comparative value when pursuit of local interests impinges on the legitimate agendas of other localities and their inhabitants, drives Professor Brilmayer to resolve the "externality" question by rejecting
both the parochiality of modern "interest analysis" and an equally
unappealing resort to intuitions from a higher sovereign about
when localism becomes "unfair." The global impacts and aspirations of parochial law are always presumed under Professor
Brilmayer's analysis to be "fair," or fairly pedigreed in a positivist
sense, but this objectivity, or outreach-the sharing implied by the
sheer (convenient or inconvenient) existence of law as a thing, an
artifact-in itself justifies no particular instance of discrimination
against outsiders. The "right" Professor Brilmayer is concerned
with is the right of organized polities to seek their autonomously
chosen goals, wherever they may lead. This "right" of sovereignty
is largely pursued through definitions of private substantive rights
and liabilities, and the assignment of jurisdiction to the state's judicial system, all in accordance with the lawmaker's policy agenda.
It is not Professor Brilmayer's chief concern either to defend or to
derive from political philosophy the defendant's civil right to sanctuary from the long-arm of imperialistic others. Tobago has as
much right, or as little, in the Hobbesian chaos, than Delaware, or
the United States themselves, to "rule the world." For Professor
Brilmayer insists that:
1. A forum's refusal to apply its own law is an application of its
own law.2

2.When the refusal is in deference to the complainer's own law,
there is never just cause for complaint (shaping is a kind of moral
estoppel).2"
3. A forum's choice to apply its own law despite complaints of
discrimination is justified if nonshaping is the only basis for
complaint.

4. One forum's gain, in succeeding with jurisdictional or choice
of law claims, is the corresponding forum's loss (the zero-sum
thesis).
25. This important insight goes back at least as far as the brilliant Professor W.W. Cook.
See generally W.W. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1942).
26. Brilmayer, supra note 1, at 412.
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5. The combination of these axioms results in a "heads I win,
tails you lose" unfairness, from the standpoint of an outsider who
is denied his own or the forum's law, for the sake of giving preference to the local interest.
Most of these theorems had their origins in legal realism, not
democratic theory. Professor Brilmayer's critique proceeds by
showing that taken together, they invite a normative heresy-the
treatment of the facts of legislative and judicial behavior as values.
It is never an independent or decisive reason to "choose" one's own
law, or to "borrow" another's, or to hale a stranger before a local
court, simply to assert that such a course would serve or disserve
forum interests. A prominent body of opinion in current choice of
law theory asserts the contrary." We may agree with Professor
Brilmayer that it is a mistake to confuse faithful political representation of local electors with the universal values embodied in their
self-serving preferences. But perhaps it is also needlessly confusing
to read either unintended generality or unintended localism into
legislation (or caselaw) that simply reflects the logrolling and expediency of democratic political processes.
More orthodox thinkers may hope that interpretive choice, as
well as the choice of what is to be interpreted, can be subsumed
under a more general theory of interstate accommodation on lines
of "comity" and general political expediency among equals who
find themselves in a "state of nature." But such lines of argument
appear to be distasteful to Professor Brilmayer, perhaps because
they collapse law into politics, or perhaps because they never manage to make the transition from politics to law in the first place.2 8
To bring "values" and universal maxims into her philosophical
framework, Professor Brilmayer finds it necessary to repaint the
line between facts and values, law and politics. In her view, the
fact of local favoritism can be both explained and defended by dismissing (as a false problem) the issue of systematic parochialism
which arises when law is seen as a purely political phenomenon.
The question of whether "we" are doing anything at all to "them,"
27. See generally BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963);
B. Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1233, 1243 (1963).
28. Political philosophers may be divided into two camps by the labels "atomists" (classic liberals as described in R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1984)) and "pluralists"
(loosely associated with Marxist, European, or critical thinking). The distinction may be
useful to the general reader, since it points up Professor Brilmayer's philosophical tradition
of liberal thought. This Commentary, on the other hand, is largely inspired by critical
thought.
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with which these reflections began, turns out to be the wrong question. The right question is the question generally associated by political theorists with Kant: whether our chosen values, embodied in
our positive law, "happen" to entail preferences or interpretations
that require us to draw distinctions between ourselves and others.
So long as we can say that our long-arming, or borrowing, or refusing to borrow is not a matter of partisan choice between "insiders"
and "outsiders" but is instead an expression of that general will
(expressed as a global and timeless imperative, or maxim of conduct) which makes us a political body, we are perfectly within our
sovereign "rights" when we impose our law, or our forum upon
nonshapers. If the exercise of those rights looks to the disinterested realist or the interested litigant like local favoritism, they
simply misconceive the nature of politics, or the political legitimacy of maxims chosen to be laws without deliberate regard to
time, person or place.
The radical dichotomy between tool and value as conceptions of
"law" is polemically useful but less philosophically persuasive,
when it is deployed against some versions of modern choice of law
theory. Values are realized in law as principles of choice. It will not
do to equivocate between instrumental understandings of legislation and of adjudication, and understandings based upon conceptions of group rights (values). Professor Brilmayer does a service
for all critics of current conflicts doctrine. She draws attention to
the fallacy of those formalisms of modern choice of law theory that
dissolve questions of value into issues of interest, only to find its
formal validity to be a certificate of a law's universal scope. She
has also directed attention to our intuition that it cannot be (politically) right to regard the chosen norm itself as sensitive to
whether its objects are shapers or nonshapers. That kind of instrumentalism would be a form of Carolene Products discrimination,
as well as violating Professor Brilmayer's jurisprudential
postulates.
But that leaves Professor Brilmayer and her readers with the
right questions left almost unasked, and certainly unanswered.
How do we determine the scope of rules adopted for domestic purposes, with domestic advantage in mind? When, if ever, is it legitimate to close the door of local courts to disputes that arose elsewhere? Upon what principles may we justify the imposition of
nonresident tuition upon some inhabitants while indiscriminately
allowing them the right to use our public parks? How do we ourselves decide who is "out of reach" of locals who wish to litigate
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here? When will others say we have overreached in arriving at that
decision, and upon what principles? The catalog could be extended
by simply adding further topical references to the contents of most
casebooks on Civil Procedure or Conflicts of Law. As Professor
Brilmayer well appreciates, each of these questions is "open," in
the sense that no political or ethical theory has yet produced a
consensus about how to resolve such problems "in principle."
Professor Brilmayer deals briefly and convincingly with the chief
candidate for a source of legal or political metatheory. She shows
that economically inspired normative systems have little to recommend them in general, and even less in specific reference to cases
of "interstate discrimination." However, she has little to say directly about the other "usual suspect," Critical Legal Studies
(CLS). The critical approach, as I understand it, has one point of
important agreement with Professor Brilmayer, which may provide
a basis for better understanding of the situation of contemporary
legal doctrine than Professor Brilmayer's "three circles." The point
of agreement is a belief that historical, political and ethical understanding of the dispute over equality, territoriality, and scope is a
necessary precondition for the understanding of the jurisdictional
and choice of law rules we find in force. Political morality is older,
deeper, more general, and therefore entitled to lexical priority in
the critique of legal doctrine. I shall therefore close these reflections with a few suggestions for an alternative diagnosis and prognosis for the development of legal discourse on "interstate discrimination," inspired by readings of critical legal literature.
IV.

THE ANTINOMIES OF CHOICE

The critical legal theorist can generally be depended upon to begin with a thesis about human nature that is less Hobbesian or
Nozickian than Professor Brilmayer's. I shall remain true to form,
and assert that the law of "interstate discrimination" will reflect
the ambivalence of our feelings about society, self and others,
known to critics as the "fundamental contradiction." We fear and
we depend on others. We fuse to form states, and then fear our
collective might, and form "rights" against each other, but more
importantly, against states. The theme of the contradiction is fusion and fugue. We cannot "go all the way" toward either of these
polarities, and so we express our vacillating needs with indeterminate rules, allowing truces to be formed along uncertain boundaries. Truce lines are fluid, but at any given moment, they appear to
settle the lines of conflict. Therefore, others call them rules, and

1987]

RIGHT QUESTIONS

invest them with long shadows, universal scope, and an illusory
permanence. The rules about crossing real geopolitical boundaries,
like other rules, will exemplify our need on the one hand for "sanctuary" or civil protection against others, and on the other for "empire," or active furtherance of our own group's agenda against the
conflicting aims of others.
. As a theoretical matter, therefore, we should not expect
to find a
single principle, or even a set of principles, that will dictate the
limits of the long-arm, nor the calculus of normative choice within
a forum, when the impulses toward fusion and fugue pull the decisionmaker in opposite directions. Professor Brilmayer's quest is
"all-or-none" in the sense that she looks to political theory for a
replacement of the nineteenth century certainties of territoriality
as a criterion for distinguishing legitimate self-interest from usurpation. Legitimacy is conceived as a form of confinement of power
within conceptual boundaries. But in contemporary practice, the
curious thing about "interstate discrimination" is the doctrinal
forms used to express the fundamental contradiction. It is extraordinarily difficult to find a metadoctrinal framework that will provide terms for an adequate description of the forces shaping the
contours of a highly irregular decisional field, marked by a surprising divergence29 between cases about the legitimate limits of extraterritorial power over absent litigants.
For the true outsider, looking at American federalism as a lessthan-ideal observer, the salient feature of our caselaw is the dichotomy between choice of law cases and long-arm cases. The supreme arbiter has decreed that the terms of argument over challenges to "personal jurisdiction" shall be voiced defensively, and in
the rhetoric of the civil right to "due process of law." That right
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment is denied whenever a
constantly revised description of the appropriate (social-contractual) nexus between individual defendant and foreign sovereign
does not "fit" the verbal formula of the day. Judgments entered
without a proper basis in social contractarian theory are not enforceable through our full faith and credit clause.
When jurisdiction over the "absent" person is justified by the
right "connections," however, the constitutional principle that dic29. This divergence was the target of a forceful attack by the late Professor Martin of
The University of Michigan. See Martin, ConstitutionalLimitations on Choice of Law, 61
CORNELL L. REv. 185, 221 (1976). His work is carried on, in important ways, by Brilmayer's
critique of Carolene Products and "interest analysis," insofar as the logic of her far-reaching
argument extends to both judicial and legislative "jurisdiction."
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tates the rule of decision is very close to a simple statement that
"anything goes." The Court tolerates a very broad range of choices
within a forum concerning the applicability of its own or of another's law. The reason for that is not hard to discern. The forum's
choice of law is the forum's choice-a matter of internal, not external significance3" in a federally organized hierarchy of power relationships. Thus the question of limits for extraterritorial outreach
is framed as a question of individual civil rights, and the question
normalization, or harmonization of "conflicting" norms of differing
but significantly connected sovereigns is virtually ignored at the
level of constitutional theory. To have power to say the law
(=juris-diction)is to have the power to say anything you like.
This is a curious state of doctrine. One might have expected instead to see "conflicts" between differing political authorities with
real interests in providing the rule (or the forum) of decision defined as political theory would define them: as collisions between
state and state, not individual and state. But that straightforward
way of conceiving the problem is "closed" pending practical constitutional repairs, because it would entail frequent invocation of the
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. On the other hand, individuals might "embody" (or be vested with) a set of rights and
immunities valid against states other than their own by virtue of
an "outsideness," defined not by their exclusion from the challenged forum's "shaping" processes, but by their inclusion as
shapers of valid and applicable rules within their own state. It is
their own state's "right" to be able to protect its citizens' interest
that might be decisive in this formulation of due process law, and
not any direct or intuitive sense of serious injustice to the individual (takings, forfeitures, error-prone procedures) that elsewhere
predominates in fourteenth amendment jurisprudence. This would
account for most of the "venue equities" ritualistically invoked to
demonstrate the deficiency of "contacts" in long-arm cases. 1
Expressing the limit of state-state power through rules vindicating individuals who challenge another state's "right" to dictate the
forum or rule of decision is further complicated however, by yet
30. See the first axiom above in Brilmayer, supra note 1, at 401, based upon Cook's
influential writings. See CooK, supra note 25, and consider its embodiment in Klaxon v.
Stentor Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
'31. The terms of the argument, as Professor Brilmayer well understands, are vulnerable
to the same kind of refutation she deploys against "externalities," unless the "equal and
opposite" venue equities of local plaintiffs are weighed by the same measure against the
assertions of inconvenience, etc., of the defendent.
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another constitutional constraint. The diversity jurisdiction of federal courts is limited by the eleventh amendment.2 Parties to private litigation may not directly or aggressively challenge the power
of a "usurping" forum ab initio, as if a federal writ of prohibition
were allowed. The solution that we observe is a variant on the
theme of Ex parte Young. a" The limits of interstate power are defined by processes allowing defensive use of "due process" immunity to determine the scope of foreign judgments or to quash foreign long-arm process. A framework of civil rights talk is thereby
abused to encode a debate about federalism, in federalism's most
dangerous form: conflicting efforts to control the same conduct by
competing and politically equal regimes.
In sum, the essentials of American state-state power relations respecting citizens must be analyzed within a four-sided structure
that pays serious attention to "due process"; to "full faith and
credit" (used here as shorthand for a regime of intrastate choice of
law laissez faire); to the closure of "original jurisdiction" as a
source of substantive law; and finally, to the eleventh amendment,
both literally and as an expression of a more general principle forbidding the equation of personal rights (against states) with the
rights of sovereign states inter sese. "Interstate discrimination" belongs within the structure thus framed more as a label than as a
principle of political equality. From the standpoint of critical
thought, little is added to Professor Brilmayer's critique by her
"concentric spheres," however charming their resemblance to the
categories of classic legal thought as described by Professor
34
Duncan Kennedy.

This is not to deny the importance of the jurisprudence of equal
protection, endogenously considered. Persons assigned by Professor Brilmayer's scheme to the second sphere do have a multitude
of equities and arguments recognized by a richly developed canon
of caselaw (epitomized by Carolene Products) for contending that
any given instance of discrepant treatment based upon their being
32. U.S. CONST. amend. XI states: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or executed against any one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State."
33. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
34. D. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Classical Legal Thought 1850-1940 (Harvard Law
School 1975) (unpublished manuscript); see also Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness; The Case of Classical Legal Thought In America 1850-

1940, 3 RESEARCH L. & Soc'y 3 (1980); Asahi Metal Ind., Ltd. v. Superior Ct., 107 S. Ct. 1026
(1987).
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political "outsiders" is constitutionally impermissible. But Professor Brilmayer is correct in maintaining that those arguments are
not properly grounded on "process defects" at all. They are instead
arguments about a sort of "religious" tolerance, given the universality of the effects and pretensions of localized political processes.
Perhaps it would be even more accurate to characterize them as
arguments about the limits of instrumental limitation, since that
form of the CLS paradox comes closest to Professor Brilmayer's
own rejection of apologetics for the use of an inside/outside distinction to dictate choice of law, if not restrictions of forum.
By the same token, critical methodology would find no place in
its box for the analysis of "rights," either of states or of their citizens. Rights cannot serve as either the source or the instantiation
of the dynamic which keeps the field of "interstate discrimination"
so interestingly unsettled. When we look at the relevant caselaw, of
course, "rights talk" is found in abundance, particularly when the
limits of personal jurisdiction are litigated. We should expect to
see rights invoked, since due process has been designated as the
dialect of disputation between local and "foreign" interests. But
the prominence of rights language is often a sign that the fundamental contradiction is pushing toward consciousness. The invocation of "rights" is a symptom, rather than a resolution of the underlying conflict between fusion and fugue. This is particularly
evident in the varieties of discourse over "interstate discrimination." For the next "critical" question is: When rights are conceived as trumps in the litigation game, from whence came the
right, and what are its limits?
"From the constitutional guarantee of due process, enforceable
against the states," begs rather than answers the critic's query,
which is not meant to be at all rhetorical. Unpacking the implicit
meanings of the stock answer, we must say that the civil right of a
wrongfully long-armed defendant is very elaborately and problematically comprised in the principles and holdings of all previous
caselaw in the area of personal jurisdiction. 5 We cannot begin to
describe it except by litigating it (uninteresting cases perhaps excepted). But the right is established to clarify limits of alien hegemony and to prevent litigation. Never mind; the more important
point (as we have seen above) is that orthodox theory holds that
35. It is noteworthy that not even Pennoyer v. Neff has been explicitly overruled-indeed, it is cited from time to time for the proposition that "territoriality still matters." See, e.g., Worldwide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Asahi Metal, 107
S. Ct. at 1026.
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the source of the right is the supreme federal sovereign, the possessor of the right is a defendant, and the right is a shield protecting
its possessor against the incursions of another "sovereign" not his
or her own. Moreover the defendant who is "given" the right is, in
an important sense, a proxy for his "proper" sovereign who "owns"
the disputed jurisdiction over him.
As this string of abstractions unfolds, the same logic dictates in
strict Hohfeldian terms that another individual, a "foreign plaintiff" has a correlative no-right to her chosen forum. She, too, is a
proxy, for the legitimate aspirations of her sovereign to further her
interests and those of all its citizens similarly situated. The end of
this line is reached when one realizes that whatever is determined
to be the right of one or the other of the various rights-givers and
rights-holders in any particular contest will only mark a truce line
for that small segment of the field of ongoing battle. The indeterminacy of our motives and the symmetries of the "externality" argument will undetermine the contours of extraterritorial power.
The fundamental contradiction will continue to generate new battles and new truces. It is a mistake, almost as fundamental as the
fundamental contradiction itself, to conclude that the outcome of
any skirmish, whether it is clear victory for a plaintiff or a defendant, establishes a general mapping of the limits of "interstate
discrimination."
The disparagement of "rights" as analytical tools does not imply
that they will be or should be abandoned as the cudgels of legal
disputation. But a usefully critical diagnosis of the "interstate discrimination" crisis would aspire to provide not only insight, but
helpful pointers leading in the direction of practical reform. There
are several conclusions implicit in my critical formulation of the
problem of interstate discrimination as the vectors of the fundamental contradiction exerting its polarizing forces within a foursided doctrinal box. First, some remodelling is in order, along lines
suggested by such very respectable traditional scholars as Professor Brilmayer and Professor Martin.
Choice of law and personal jurisdiction should be seen and analyzed as complementary aspects of a single problem. There is no
good reason to leave the subject of "conflicts of law" unconstitutionalized.3 It remains an area of "lawyers' law" and of esoteric
36. Unless, of course, the prevailing doctrine reflects processes that are not importantly
"broken" and therefore do not need to be "fixed." The extraordinarily prolific and passionate literature generated by recent cases like Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302
(1981), is powerful evidence, however, that theory, if not practice, is significantly "broken."
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academic theory, largely because no constitutional theorist has
come up with a good framework for rationalizing federal intrusion
into the states' self-favoring practices in choosing their rules of decision. The long shadow of the Erie doctrine3 7 has too long conspired with the felt awkwardness of "due process" as a constitutional rubric for interstate disputation, to prevent any major
conceptual breakthroughs.
Harmonization of the two major categories of "interstate discrimination" identified by Brilmayer, Martin, and others could, of
course, run in the other direction, without surprising a critical observer. The law of personal jurisdiction could be deconstitutionalized, or at least reformulated on some basis other than fourteenth
amendment due process. Then, both choice of law and long-arm
rules might be dictated by the several states pretty much at their
pleasure. Provision of either the forum or the rule of decision for
any particular dispute would depend upon races to the courthouse,
punctuated by occasional interventions by the federal judiciary in
accordance with a constitutional norm that gave more realistic attention to the kinds of "interest analysis" which supplanted vested
rights and territoriality in the revolutionary interval between the
First and Second Restatements of Conflicts of Law. Either way,
from the critical perspective, the puzzle is to devise a more politically candid doctrinal embodiment of the fundamental contradiction (at a constitutional or international level) than the vapid and
inchoate "interest" categories used by the Second Restatement as
"factors" in "choosing" to stay local or go elsewhere for a rule of
decision. I suspect that no responsible solon would wish to see any
of the principal contemporary schools of choice of law theory imposed from above upon competing states as principles of priority
in their struggle of each against all. The reason for summarily dismissing such fixes is simple: choice of law ideology is currently devoted to enlarging the discretion of the forum judges"8 to decide
which foreign elements "count" and for how much, in determining
See Kozyris, Reflections on Allstate-The Lessening of Due Process in Choice of Law, 14
U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 889 (1981); Lowenfeld & Silberman, Choice of Law and The Supreme
Court: A Dialogue Inspired by Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 14 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 841
(1981). For a symposium on choice of law theory after Allstate v. Hague, see 10 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1 (1981). For additional insight see, Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16
STAN.

L. REV. 4 (1963).

37. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
38. This paper is not the place to defend that agenda, which the writer fully supports.
My point is that analysis of "what to choose" or "when to choose," the central topics of
conflicts doctrine, is radically different from the analysis of the limits of choice. If choice
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the appropriate rule of decision. The constitutional task is to do
the opposite: to restrict discretion and limit choice (and reach), on
a principled basis.
The needed innovation is a protocol of jurisdictional priorities
established by a common law (necessarily federal) of centering.
Current choice of law talk with its factors and interests (and centering) is a step in the right direction, but is curiously inside-out.
Court-watchers are well advised to pay careful heed to the curious
and tentative deference given to parochial choice of law theory in
the more recent and nuanced formulations of "contacts" that will
be counted for personal jurisdiction. The strength of a forum's theoretic claim to provide the rule of decision is one factor in the assessment of long-arm claims. But the Court has flatly rejected proposals to reverse the direction of analysis. I would explain the
Court's aversion toward constitutionalizing the Second Restatement of Conflicts as a systematic method for resolving interstate
collisions of power vis a vis private litigants as a healthy judicial
reaction to the intuition that the Second Restatement mediates a
denial of conflict through the enlargement of choice; the recognition of real cross-purposes entails the restriction of local choice by
constructing a hard-edged protocol of priorities. Therefore, I would
predict that when a better conflicts doctrine is built, the Court will
impose it upon the states. 9
The same "democratic theory" that inspires Professor
Brilmayer's search for a new foundation of "interstate discrimination" doctrine thus appears to this CLS-sympathizer as an embodiment of everything that obstructs a simplification and moderate
improvement of the terms of doctrinal discourse in the field rather
awkwardly called "interstate discrimination." While Professor
Brilmayer celebrates the innocence of outreach, her states appear
to exercise their "rights" in a modified state of nature. They can
capture foreign assets through local judgments validated by the
long-arm test of the moment, and they can be whimsical in the
extreme with theories about recognition of claims based upon law
shaped by others. Perhaps the four-sided box would be marginally
improved if the long overdue collapse of choice and reach were accomplished by transposing the current domination of "jurisdicshould be entirely "free" for the choosing authority, the legal status quo would need no
fixing at all.
39. See Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985). This is a sign that the Court is
now beginning to "close the gap" by restricting a forum's choices of law when dealing with
the rights of outsiders.
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tion" over "choice of law." By imagining such a reversal, we can
see that the length of the long-arm would be constitutionally limited only by the presently permissive options to choose forum law.
As constitutional permission to "go local" for the rule of decision is
presently almost limitless, the reach of the long-arm would be dramatically extended. The equal and opposite equities of local plain-

tiffs and distant defendants would then have to be resolved
through a conceptual exercise of "centering" the disputed event or
transaction, possibly in a third jurisdiction.
This approach would invite a rationale of an "ideal observer" or
Rawlsian chooser to dictate the rule, and hence the judicial reach,
of unwelcome burdens (of defense or of substantive obligation)
founded upon others' law. The constitutional arbiter could no
longer avoid taking sides within a calculus that gives plaintiffs
their due (and reciprocal) measure of concern. Present due process
doctrine unfortunately excludes the "venue equities" of local plaintiffs by framing interstate power struggles exclusively as a problem
of defendant immunity. Moreover, the process-oriented appeals of
both plaintiffs and defendants should ideally be considered in their
fullest substantive context.
We might expect the shift from process rhetoric to outright debate over competing substantive values to move like this: When
challenged, the Tobago-state 0 (or its private litigant as proxy)
would be called upon to plead something more than the fickle comity or infinitely manipulable principles of domestic choice of law to
justify its claim of supremacy. On the other hand, the sanctuary
state would have to overcome a presumption that its law was part
of a discreditable race for the bottom. A period of cynical realism
would allow ideal judicial observers to take full and explicit account of interstate "competition" through rules favoring corporate
migration, or populistically ample limitation periods, 1 and the
like. The politically "free" decision of any particular state to
"shape" its laws with a pro-creditor or pro-debtor bias could no
longer be ignored or relegated to an extra-legal realm of "politics."
Post-cynical discourse would reflect uneasy but empirically
"'proven" compromises expressed as a combination of modest but
uniform "venue" rules, and immodest and nonuniform principles
40. A term used for convenience here to denote any jurisdiction with expansive claims of
legislative or judicial jurisdiction.
41. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976), and New Hampshire's "unusually
long (six year) limitations period for libel" noted in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465
U.S. 770 (1984).
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' rather than political reof priority founded in ideas of "justice"42
sponsiveness, to limit the conflicting aspirations of competing

states.
In broad outline, the utopia sketched above is a composite of
critical and traditional scholarship. One attraction of a critical perspective is its demand that we raise the best question of all: How is
progress toward a more coherent and plausible system of interstate
power sharing stymied by current doctrine? The fundamental contradiction shows its power to elucidate "interstate discrimination"
most dramatically in the dilemmas posed by the "merely practical"
constraints of the fourth side of the four-sided box.
Original jurisdiction, exercised when state sues state, simply cannot be the source of the utopian order we have outlined. Perhaps
no form of federal jurisdiction can be expected to provide our
"ideal observer" with the necessary warrant to interfere. The competing states do not sufficiently fear each other to demand the exercise of supreme authority to settle their differences, and litigating individuals are so shrouded in veils of ignorance and the
exigencies of trial that they can neither identify nor politically express consistent "interests" in shaping national patterns of interstate law one way or another; nor can they sue states in federal
court.
Thus the conflicts of both "law" and "jurisdiction" that beguile
Professor Brilmayer's imagination, and this response to it, occupy
a middle ground between constitutional controversy and mine-run
private binary disputes. The proper forum for such disputes is
neither of the interested states (for as rights-owning individuals in
Brilmayer's analysis, they would violate the rule of Dr. Bonham's
Case43 if they were judges of their own cause) nor a federal tribunal serving any self-executing forms of constitutional authority. Instead, the diversity clause" might be used to justify new jurisdictional legislation empowering the federal courts to generate a
unified caselaw of "interstate discrimination" by entertaining suits
in the nature of prerogative writs for interlocutory mandates to
42. "[F]ortuitous event[s] ... should not of [themselves] shape the nature of the ensuing
litigation." State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 535 (1967) (accomodating an interest in orderly administration of a limited insurance reserve for mass tort victims
with the victims' interest in a convenient forum).
43. 8 Co. Rep. 114, 118 (1610) (It is improper to adjudicate a cause when the court is
financially interested in the outcome.).
44. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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state courts.' 5 The federal court could give two kinds of remedy for
the sake of avoiding uncertainty in cases with interstate aspects
being litigated in state court: It could either order a state forum to
transfer the matter to a more appropriate state forum (federalized
forum non conveniens on the model of 28 U.S.C. §1404), or it
could direct the forum to follow a "foreign" rule of decision at
odds with local choice of law rules. Such a federal jurisdictional
statute would reverse the holding of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electronic Manufacturing. Co.," and open up a new common law field
of federal choice of law doctrine.
V.

CONCLUSION

Pending that distant day when impending border wars' 7 between
the states make new orderings politically desirable, the CLS-inspired forecast is for more of the same heavy weather. The current
sedarian muddles of choice of law theory are performing their mediating function very well. The law, and even the principles generating the law of the forum about when the law of the forum is
really the law of another forum, is open, debatable, manipulable,
and therefore accommodating. It allows endless experiments in
metatheory and in expressing discretionary outcomes through mystifying generalities.
On the other hand, the federalized half of the problem, due process cases about personal jurisdiction, is in crisis. The task of reform is accordingly beset with more serious difficulties. Existing
law embodies a tacit and indefensible bias favoring bigger and
more regular players 48 at the expense of local and irregular players.
It invites oppressive (or at least unpoliced) manipulations based
upon disparate bargaining power and the contractual ideology of
"consent" to choice of forum, consent to foreign service of process,
and a variety of similar adhesionary devices.' 9 The pendular char45. This might be accomplished with as little thought or attention to detail as the federal common law provision. See Labor Management Relations Act (Taft Hartley Act), 29
U.S.C. § 85 (1982), that was sustained in Textile Workers of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. 448 (1957).
46. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
47. For the kernel of a scenario, see James v. Grand Trunk Western Rwy., 14 Ill.2d 356,
152 N.E.2d 858, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 915 (1958).
48. See the elegant matrices of Galanter, Why The Haves Come Out Ahead: Speculations on The Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'v REV. 95 (1974).
49. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (defendant brought to
franchisors forum under the terms of a standard franchise); Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405
U.S. 174 (1972) (cognovit note held valid if its waiver of constitutional rights 'voluntary,
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acter of "due process" jurisdictional doctrine has been widely
noted, and now that we have experienced two swings (from Pennoyer to McGee5 ° to Worldwide Volkswagen,"' roughly speaking),
it is widely felt that the time has come to redefine the very elements of analysis.
Scholarly debates of the kind initiated by Professor Brilmayer
reflect a larger crisis in legal thought. We should be very grateful
to her for stimulating genuinely radical re-examination of our postulates, whether we endorse her political theory, a more critical orientation, or some other vision of jurisprudence. Let us hope that
our respective ideologies can be assayed as competing oracles
prophesying different outcomes for a change long overdue.

knowing, and intellegently made'); National Equipment Rental v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311
(1964) (Michigan farmers held to have consented to jurisdiction by signing form lease naming a New York clerk for plaintiff as their agent for service of process). Arguably, Burger
King brings Justice Black's dissenting prophecy in National Equipment, 375 U.S. at 318,
that such clauses would become common, to fulfillment. Another interesting and more recent example is Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 55 U.S.L.W. 4757 (U.S. June
8, 1987), holding that arbitration agreements in standard brokerage contracts constitute a
valid and enforcable "choice" of forum.
50. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
51. Worldwide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).

